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Implementation of the resolutions of the United Nations

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Sixty-fourth year

Letter dated 6 February 2009 from the Permanent Representative of Greece to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

For the last 15 years that the outstanding issue of the name of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia remains unresolved, despite the international and bilateral efforts undertaken in the context of the United Nations, Greece has continuously been faced with a conduct on the part of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia which contravenes the letter and the spirit of the Interim Accord, signed by Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on 13 September 1995. This conduct is not in line with Security Council resolutions 817 (1993) and 845 (1993) and not consistent with the general principles of international law enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. It unsettles good-neighbourly relations and undermines the climate of mutual trust and confidence which is necessary for the progress of the ongoing negotiations carried out under the auspices of the United Nations.

Greece has repeatedly denounced this behaviour on the part of the Government of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia at both the bilateral and international level, but to no avail, since the latter has not ceased so far its unlawful course of action or taken any corrective measures.

Some of the most recent examples of the unchanged provocative and offensive policy of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are the following:

The decision, published in the Official Gazette of the Government of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, volume 164, on 29 December 2008, to name part of the Pan-European Corridor X that runs through its territory after Alexander the Great, who is universally acknowledged as a prominent Greek historical figure. It should be noted that this project was to be partly financed by Greece, which had pledged the amount of 50 million euros as a contribution to the economic development, not only of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia but also of the entire region of South-East Europe.

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The decision to name the main stadium of Skopje after Philip II of Macedon, father of Alexander the Great.

The use of the "Sun of Vergina" as a symbol of this country in government-financed television spots broadcast in both domestic and international media, while the Interim Accord in article 7, paragraph 2, categorically prohibits the use, in any way, of this symbol by the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Greece has officially protested about these actions to the authorities of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, requesting that adequate corrective measures be taken.

Notwithstanding the above, Greece remains committed to the objective of reaching speedily a mutually agreed solution to the name issue in the interests of peaceful and good-neighbourly relations in accordance with Security Council resolutions 817 (1993) and 845 (1993), while scrupulously abiding by the Interim Accord.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 109, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) John **Mourikis**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations A/63/713

General Assembly

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Sixty-third session
Agenda item 128
Report on the activities of the Office of Internal Oversight Services

Programme evaluation of the performance and the achievement of results by the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire

Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services

"Aspects of the Ouagadougou Agreement are impacting the mission's overall achievement of results, however, its presence remains critical to the peace process"

Summary

The present report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) is the result of its in-depth programme evaluation of the performance and the accomplishment of results by the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), which was selected for evaluation on the basis of an OIOS risk assessment of peacekeeping operations. OIOS notes that the mission's performance and results achievement have not been evaluated since its establishment in 2004. The objective of the evaluation was to determine the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and impact of UNOCI in relation to its mandated objectives.

OIOS found that the mandate of the mission is relevant as a framework for United Nations intervention in Côte d'Ivoire, as stipulated in Security Council resolutions 1528 (2004), 1609 (2005), 1795 (2008) and 1826 (2008). OIOS observed substantial progress with regard to the mandated elements over which the mission has direct operational control, whereas limited progress has been achieved with respect to the mandated tasks where UNOCI plays a supporting role and the Ivorians are in the lead. Many of the targets established in Council resolutions and the political accords signed by the Ivorian parties, such as elections and disarmament, have either not been achieved or postponed. Furthermore, OIOS observed that progress has been made in integration of cross-cutting issues such as gender

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mainstreaming and child protection into mandated areas and some best practices have been developed and shared with other missions. OIOS further observed that while the Ouagadougou Agreement, signed in 2007, addressed key issues that were hindering the implementation of the peace process in Côte d'Ivoire, it had resulted in some contradiction with the UNOCI mandate and had added a degree of ambiguity to the mission's role. While the Council continued to renew all previous mandates, it also requested UNOCI to limit its role to supporting the full implementation of the Ouagadougou Agreement, while the Ivorian parties assumed the lead role.

According to a local population survey carried out by OIOS, the population of Côte d'Ivoire overall holds a positive view of UNOCI and of United Nations peacekeeping in general. The population appreciates the activities of UNOCI in the country and its critical role in the peace process. In addition, the mission's operations are viewed positively and are considered to be extremely necessary to ensuring stability and the secure environment critical for the elections, post-conflict development and lasting peace in the region. Furthermore, the survey noted strong regional trends in attitudes about how long UNOCI should stay in the country after the elections. The population in the centre/north-west of the country and in the confidence zone believes that UNOCI should stay on well after the elections; while that in the south and east shows less interest in a prolonged role for UNOCI.

OIOS also identified the following critical issues:

(a) Strategic planning at UNOCI needs strengthening: the mission implementation plan is not updated regularly, which has resulted in inadequate guidance for mission priorities; and integrated planning is lacking at the mission's operational levels and with key partners. Additionally, OIOS finds that UNOCI lacks an exit strategy that addresses consolidation, drawdown and withdrawal;

(b) The organization of free and fair elections in Côte d'Ivoire risks being compromised by logistical and technical problems, including the identification and registration of voters. Additionally, there are insufficient financial resources for the conduct of elections, which constitutes a challenge for the Government of the country. The postponement of elections presents UNOCI with an opportunity to reassert and utilize its experience, capacity and independence in the organization of elections by enabling the national authorities to determine a clear and credible electoral calendar and address requisite conditions that must be established prior to elections in a comprehensive manner. However, the dual role of certification and supporting the elections could put the mission's credibility at risk if it is not diligently managed by UNOCI;

(c) The limited progress in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), disarmament and dismantling of militias (DDM) programme, and the absence of a formal mechanism for coordinating security sector reform in Côte d'Ivoire pose risks to the peace process. The DDR/DDM programme in Côte d'Ivoire is a nationally driven process led by the Ivorian parties and supported by UNOCI and while there is some planning and coordination at the mission it requires strengthening. Likewise, the national integrated command centre, which is responsible for planning and implementing the programme, lacks institutional capacity and needs strengthening;

(d) Despite the limited progress in implementing the DDR/DDM programme, some progress has been made towards addressing the short-term needs of ex-combatants as evidenced by reinsertion programmes such as the "1,000 micro-projects" initiative. However, OIOS could not determine if a formal needs assessment had been undertaken to determine the actual requirements and preferences of beneficiaries. Nor has there been an in-depth sensitization of the projects, which constitute significant risk to the success of the micro-projects initiative;

(e) Overall coordination with regional partners needs strengthening;

(f) There is a threat of violence erupting during and after the elections that endangers the safety of United Nations personnel and institutions and that needs to be closely managed and mitigated by the senior management, inter alia, through the tightening of security.

The present report contains 16 recommendations to UNOCI to address these challenges, improve its performance and promote the achievement of results. The report has been reviewed by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support and UNOCI. The mission has provided specific comments and additional information on each of the recommendations which have been incorporated throughout the report in italics. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations has taken note of the comments of the mission.

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I. Introduction

1. The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) undertook a programme evaluation of the performance and achievement of results by the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) in accordance with its mandate.[1] UNOCI was identified for this evaluation on the basis of an OIOS risk assessment of all peacekeeping operations. The mission's performance and results achievement have not been independently evaluated since its establishment. Since 2004, Côte d'Ivoire has experienced a political stalemate, with limited progress achieved in resolving the crisis, and there have been renewed hostilities during this period. In addition, many of the targets established by the Security Council in its resolutions and in the political accords signed by the Ivorian parties, such as elections and disarmament, have either not been achieved or postponed.

2. The purpose of the programme evaluation was to determine the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and impact of UNOCI in relation to its objectives. The evaluation focused on the progress made towards achievement of the mission's mandate and its operational objectives, the relevance of the mandates, activities and outputs in the context of the current political situation, the efficiency with which outputs were delivered, the validity of strategies and partnership arrangements and the identification of good practices and lessons learned that can inform other peacekeeping missions.

II. Methodology

3. OIOS utilized a variety of qualitative and quantitative methods, including the following data sources:

(a) A self-administered survey of all international staff, United Nations Volunteers, senior military and police staff;[2]

(b) In-depth interviews with senior mission management and staff;

(c) In-depth interviews with representatives of the Government of Côte d'Ivoire, including opposition parties;

(d) In-depth interviews with staff of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support and with former United Nations senior management;

(e) Interviews with representatives of United Nations agencies, funds and programmes;

(f) In-depth interviews with external stakeholders;[3]

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[1] See General Assembly resolutions 48/218 B, 54/244 and 59/272, ST/SGB/2002/7 and Article 97 of the Charter of the United Nations.

[2] The staff survey had a response rate of 13 per cent.

[3] Field visits were undertaken to interview senior management and staff in UNOCI as well as stakeholders, including, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (Nigeria), the facilitation team, the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL), the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA).

(g) Review of United Nations documents, including reports of the Secretary-General, budget and performance reports and reports of technical assessment missions.

4. In addition to the above, in the summary of 2008 a survey of the population of Côte d'Ivoire was undertaken in order to provide a quantitative assessment of UNOCI activities and gauge the perceptions of ordinary civilians and former combatants about the impact of its operations in its mandated areas.[4] The survey, designed to generate results representative of the entire resident population of Côte d'Ivoire, was drawn as a multi-stage probability sample from 68 localities based on geographical stratification of the country into five regions: north, centre, west, south and the city of Abidjan. The sample size of 1,459 individuals aged 15 years or older, included 1,206 civilians and 253 ex-combatants.[5] Auxiliary data and weighting adjustments were employed to ensure that the sample conformed to the current demographic estimates of the civilian population. Survey interviews were conducted in local languages by enumerators trained to minimize error and potential bias in the interviews.

5. The evaluation had a limitation regarding the response rate to the staff member survey. The response was low in contrast to previous OIOS peacekeeping inspections and evaluations. While it is difficult to determine the exact cause for the low response rate, it could be attributable to an unfounded fear among the respondents regarding confidentiality and to survey fatigue. OIOS addressed this limitation by conducting a large number of interviews and basing all findings on multiple sources, including a nationally representative survey of the national population.

6. The report has been reviewed by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support and UNOCI. The mission has provided specific comments and additional information on each of the recommendations, which have been incorporated throughout the report in italics. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations has taken note of the mission's comments. OIOS greatly appreciates the cooperation and assistance extended to it by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support and the senior leadership and staff of UNOCI during the evaluation.

III. Background

7. The conflict in Côte d'Ivoire started in 1999, following a military coup, and in October 2002 the main rebel groups merged to form the "Forces nouvelles". The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) deployed peacekeeping troops in January 2003 to contain the conflict and maintain the east-west ceasefire line known as the zone of confidence, which separated the country's northern and southern regions. There were numerous agreements aiming to address the conflict during the period from 2002 to 2005, but the situation remained unresolved and a United Nations peacekeeping mission was deployed.

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[4] See Laying a foundation for peace: a quantitative impact evaluation of United Nations operations in Côte d'Ivoire, Eric Mvukiyehe and Cyrus Samii, 19 December 2008.

[5] The survey had a response rate of 87 per cent and a maximum margin of error of 3 per cent.

8. UNOCI was established by the Security Council by its resolution 1528 (2004) after the Council determined that the situation in Côte d'Ivoire presented a threat to international peace and security in the region. UNOCI replaced the United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI), established in May 2003 in order to facilitate the implementation of the peace agreement signed by the Ivorian parties in January 2003.

9. The Security Council authorized UNOCI to operate under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate, within its capabilities and its areas of deployment. The total budget allocated to UNOCI since its establishment amounts to over $2.6 billion. The current mandated activities of the mission as stipulated in resolution 1528 (2004) and further developed by Resolution 1609 (2005) and by resolution 1826 (2008), which extended the mission's mandate to 31 January 2009, include:

(a) Monitoring of the cessation of hostilities and movements of armed groups;

(b) Disarmament, demobilization, reintegration (DDR), repatriation and resettlement;

(c) Disarmament and dismantling of militias (DDM);

(d) Operation of the identification of the population and registration of voters;

(e) Reform of the security sector;

(f) Protection of United Nations personnel, institutions and civilians;

(g) Monitoring of the arms embargo;

(h) Support for humanitarian assistance;

(i) Support for the redeployment of State administration;

(j) Support for the organization of open, free, fair and transparent elections;

(k) Assistance in the field of human rights;

(l) Public information;

(m) Law and order.

Ivorians assume ownership of the peace process under the Ouagadougou Agreement

10. On 4 March 2007, the Ivorian parties signed the Ouagadougou Agreement under the mediation of the Chairman of ECOWAS, Blaise Compaoré, President of Burkina Faso. The Agreement, which built upon Security Council resolution 1721 (2006) and previous peace agreements, addressed key issues that had blocked the implementation of the peace process and an implementation schedule outlined the completion of the key process within a period of 10 months. The Agreement was later submitted and endorsed by the Security Council.

11. Under the Ouagadougou Agreement the lead role in the peace process for the Ivorians and a "supporting and accompanying" role was given to external parties,

including the United Nations. The Agreement seeks to resolve the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire by addressing numerous contentious issues, including the formation of a new transitional government, an integrated command centre to lead the assimilation of opposing forces, Forces nouvelles and government, into a new national army, the elimination of the zone of confidence and the disarmament and demobilization of former combatants. Importantly, the Agreement also projected the resumption of the voter registration and identification processes to enable the holding of elections within 10 months.

IV. Findings of the evaluation

12. The programme evaluation examined a number of key issues, which are organized into four main areas: mandate implementation; strategic planning; key programmatic processes; and coordination and security.

A. Mandate implementation

1. The mission's achievement of mandated tasks has been mixed due to the slow progress in the peace process

13. The mission's 13 mandated areas of action have been grouped into five components in the UNOCI budget framework and performance reports, which are used to assess its performance and achievement of results: ceasefire; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; humanitarian and human rights; peace process; and law and order.

14. The OIOS assessment of the mission's achievement of results is based on a review of documents from 2004-2008, including Secretary-General's progress reports on UNOCI, results-based budgeting logical frameworks, performance reports, staff survey and interviews, as well as a survey of the population of Côte d'Ivoire. OIOS notes that UNOCI was able to achieve substantial progress with regard to the mandated elements under components 1 and 3 (ceasefire, and humanitarian and human rights) over which it has direct operational control, whereas, limited progress has been achieved on the mandated elements under components 2, 4 and 5 (DDR, the peace process and law and order), where UNOCI plays its mandated supporting role and the Ivorian parties have the lead role. OIOS did observe one important element, however, under component 4, pertaining to public information, where substantial progress had been achieved. Advances have also been made in integrating cross-cutting issues, such as gender mainstreaming, child protection and HIV/AIDS, into mandated areas.

Component 1: Ceasefire

15. The ceasefire includes monitoring of the cessation of hostilities and movements of armed groups, protection of United Nations personnel, institutions and civilians and monitoring of the arms embargo. Substantial progress was noted under component 1, as evidenced by the fact that UNOCI has continued to maintain a safe and secure environment with no serious breaches of the ceasefire. OIOS also found that protection of United Nations personnel, institutions and civilians has been effective. While progress towards monitoring of the arms embargo has also

been made through the establishment of a monitoring mechanism, which facilitated random inspections with no violations being reported. However, progress was somewhat compromised due to the restricted access granted by the Government to inspection and monitoring of the arms embargo. Overall, the mission has been successful in monitoring the cessation of hostilities owing to its robust peacekeeping force, which possesses the strength necessary to maintain secure conditions. The positive assessment and confidence of the mission's progress under the component is fully supported by the results of the staff survey.[6]

16. UNOCI has generally been able to ensure a secure and stable environment in the country, which the United Nations country team, national parties and external stakeholders noted as vital to the peace process. In addition, the population survey shows that the majority of Ivorians appreciate the role of the peacekeeping force in putting an end to the conflict, with 58 per cent of civilians and 67 per cent of ex-combatants noting the positive role of UNOCI in preventing belligerents from relaunching war. The survey also found that the Ivorian population perceived that the potential for renewed conflict declined more quickly and substantially in areas where peacekeepers were present.

17. On some occasions, however, OIOS noted with serious concern that the peacekeeping force did not offer a clear response in situations where civilians were under attack or in threat of physical danger. Additionally, during visits to sectors, OIOS noted a lack of understanding among some senior military commanders regarding the role of the military, in particular with regard to the protection of civilians. In this regard, previous reports by civil society groups alleged that UNOCI troops in the western region had failed to intervene when civilians were under attack. Furthermore, the survey of the population found that, while the majority considers that the mission's presence is preventing the re-escalation of the conflict and offering comfort, there was frustration regarding the lack of timely response to reports of attacks. OIOS noted and concurs with the recommendation made by the technical assessment mission carried out by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in March 2008 that UNOCI should provide clarification to contingent commanders and ensure that they have accurate, full and common understanding of the mission's responsibilities and rules of engagement according to its mandate under Chapter VII of the Charter.

Component 2: Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

18. OIOS notes limited progress under component 2, DDR, including DDM, owing to slow progress in the political process. UNOCI was able to provide support, as mandated, through activities such as the collection and storage of weapons, the construction of cantonment sites, the destruction of unserviceable weapons and the provision of security. Additionally, progress was noted in the elimination of the recruitment and employment of child soldiers within the country. Data from the staff

[6] According to the survey, with regard to the monitoring of the cessation of hostilities and movements of armed groups: 69.5 per cent of respondents indicated that UNOCI has and will achieve results in this mandated area; protection of United Nations institutions, personnel and civilians: 68.5 per cent of respondents indicated that UNOCI has achieved results in this mandated area; while 72.2 per cent indicated that UNOCI will achieve results in this mandated area; monitoring of the arms embargo: 51.8 per cent of respondents indicated that UNOCI has achieved results in this mandated area; while 49.7 per cent indicated that UNOCI will achieve results in this mandated area.

survey aligns with this assessment.[7] The lack of progress under these mandated elements is discussed in greater detail in section C on DDR/DDM and security sector reform.

Component 3: Humanitarian assistance and assistance in the field of human rights

19. Progress was evident under component 3, support for humanitarian assistance and assistance in the field of human rights. Prior to the establishment of the mission, a fragile state of affairs existed in both of these areas. Conditions in regard to education, health, water and sanitation had been declining and serious and widespread human rights violations were perpetrated against civilians with no action taken to prosecute the perpetrators. Progress in these areas is evidenced by reported improvements throughout the country, which have been made possible through the mission's advocacy and monitoring efforts. The situation has also improved as a result of the re-establishment of access to the local population and by services provided by the humanitarian agencies. These efforts will continue in both areas but will require further improvement in local institutional capacity. The staff survey shows that mission staff perceive that positive improvements have taken place in both of these areas.[8]

20. The results of the survey of the Ivorian population show that the public views UNOCI as playing a major role in humanitarian assistance and in applying the right geographic distribution of assistance, although the overall level of assistance is considered to be too low. The geographic region where the population is most in favour of the mission's role is in the areas most damaged by the war, in the confidence zone near the Liberian border. With regard to human rights, OIOS found that the population characterized UNOCI as "impartial" and "always respectful" although civilians in the centre, north-west, and in the confidence zone expressed significantly more confidence than those in the south and east of the country.

Component 4: Peace process

21. The peace process component comprises several elements, including public information, identification of the population and registration of voters, support for the redeployment of State administration and support for the organization of open, free and fair elections. OIOS found that progress under component 4 is mixed. There has been substantial progress in the field of public information owing to the fact that UNOCI has direct operational control over it, while progress in other mandated areas is slow due to the mission's limited role.

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[7] In the staff survey, 21.4 per cent of respondents indicated that UNOCI has achieved results in DDR, while 35.3 per cent indicated that UNOCI will achieve results in this area; 16.5 per cent of respondents indicated that UNOCI has achieved results in DDM, while 29.4 per cent indicated that UNOCI will achieve results in this area; 32.6 per cent of respondents indicated that UNOCI has achieved results in security sector reform, while 43.4 per cent indicated that UNOCI will achieve results in this area.

[8] In the staff survey, under support for humanitarian assistance: 70 per cent of respondents indicated that UNOCI has achieved results in this mandated area, while 72.8 per cent indicated that UNOCI will achieve results in this mandated area; for assistance to human rights, 70.6 per cent of respondents indicated that UNOCI has achieved results in this mandated area, while 75.4 per cent indicated that UNOCI will achieve results in this mandated area.

22. Public information is an important element of the peace process. OIOS found that UNOCI has been effective in promoting an understanding of the peace process and the mission's mandate to the political parties and the general population. The mission has also collaborated with local media and civil society. OIOS notes that UNOCI also monitors and analyses daily media, countering any disinformation about the peace process. Since 2004, the mission has run UNOCI FM radio, which it established to promote peace and national reconciliation in Côte d'Ivoire. The station is widely perceived as providing unbiased and non-partisan information, broadcasting cultural, political, economic, entertainment and sports programmes in French and many local languages, 24-hours a day, seven days a week. OIOS found that half the adult population surveyed listens regularly to the radio station.

23. UNOCI continues to provide ongoing technical assistance and logistical support to the electoral and identification processes. It has also assisted in the redeployment of state administration and responds to the national authorities, as required. The mission remains constrained, however, in terms of proactive planning, given the lack of clarity and limited accompanying role it has assumed under the peace process. For example, while UNOCI provided support to the mobile court system for identification of the population and voter registration, it had no role in its administration, which is under the Independent Electoral Commission. Hence, progress in this area was considerably delayed. The lack of progress of these mandated elements is discussed in greater detail in section C below.

24. *UNOCI commented that the redeployment of State administration throughout the country has been a slow process, but that it is an internal matter to be addressed by the Government of Côte d'Ivoire, with UNOCI providing technical and logistical support.*

Component 5: Law and order

25. There has been limited progress with regard to component 5, law and order, which is interlinked to two main areas: restoring civilian policing and assisting in re-establishing the authority of the judiciary and the rule of law throughout the country. While UNOCI has provided assistance, as mandated, in this area, progress has been limited due to the slow progress of the peace process. This has caused severe delays regarding the restructuring of the police services and the judiciary. Progress has occurred through the mission's ongoing technical advice to the Government on various issues such as re-establishing a prison system, redeployment of the judiciary and penitentiary system and raising funds for technical assistance programmes. UNOCI has also provided training courses in the maintenance of public law and order, human rights, community policing and criminal investigations. in addition to undertaking joint patrols and continuing to liaise and advise the National Police and Gendarmerie, as required.

Cross-cutting areas

26. OIOS observed that advances have been made in integrating cross-cutting issues, such as gender mainstreaming, child protection and HIV/AIDS into mandated areas. The advisers for gender, child protection and HIV/AIDS have all played an active role in their respective areas by sensitizing and training civilian and military staff. Collaboration with the United Nations country team and non-governmental organizations in the country has also contributed to strengthening

local capacity on these issues. In addition, there have been major achievements with regard to the elimination of child soldiers, the integration of the gender perspective into various elements of the peace process and the implementation of the Ouagadougou Agreement, for example in the electoral and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes, and the collaborative programming partnership between the HIV/AIDS Unit and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). However, while results have been achieved in these cross-cutting areas, a lack of adequate staffing has resulted in a limited scope of activities, which has been compensated for by the dedication, innovation and networking skills of the staff in these sections.

27. UNOCI has developed a number of good practices that have contributed to improved performance in different fields and have been shared with other missions. For example, a protection group task force, comprising representatives from HIV/AIDS, gender, child protection and human rights areas and the UNPOL has been established to work with victims of sexual violence and abuse. Additionally, the Communication and Information Technology Section has worked with the Conduct and Discipline Unit and the Electoral Assistance Division on customizing databases to assist them with their work and increase efficiency.

2. Ambiguity in the convergence of the Ouagadougou Agreement with the UNOCI mandate is impacting the mission's contribution to the peace process

28. The Ouagadougou Agreement altered the United Nations role in the Côte d'Ivoire peace process. In accordance with the Agreement, the Ivorian parties assumed ownership and leadership and the United Nations and the international community took a supportive role. In particular, the Agreement called on the international community to join the Ivorian institutions in undertaking the tasks set out in the Agreement, providing the requisite resources, technical advice and logistical support while observing the implementation process, and also stated that, in accompanying, advising and assisting the Ivorian institutions in undertaking these tasks, the United Nations and international partners should avoid substituting for or imposing decisions on the national authorities.

29. In his thirteenth progress report on UNOCI, the Secretary-General noted that the Ouagadougou Agreement was silent on several major tasks previously performed by UNOCI, including its role in the electoral and certification process (S/2007/275, para. 13). It was noted that this ambiguity created a widespread impression that the signatories to the Agreement were seeking a limited role for the United Nations in the peace process and expected a UNOCI drawdown (ibid., para. 14). The signatories to the Agreement later clarified that the Organization was expected to continue to play an important role in the peace process, in particular in supporting the implementation of the key tasks set out in the Agreement. It was also confirmed that UNOCI was expected to work in collaboration with the integrated command centre to implement the tasks leading to the removal of the zone of confidence, to assist in providing security for the elections and, in particular, to observe the electoral process and provide technical advice to the Ivorian institutions.

30. UNOCI has adapted itself to the new phase of the peace process in Côte d'Ivoire as recommended in the thirteenth progress report, which was fully endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 1765 (2007). In that resolution, the Council also renewed UNOCI's mandate and requested that it support the full

implementation of the Ouagadougou Agreement within existing resources by supporting numerous areas critical to the peace process.[9] OIOS notes that the inclusion of these areas in addition to the renewal of the mission's mandate while simultaneously requesting that it play a supportive role contributed to the ambiguity of its part in the peace process.

31. As a result of the lack of clarity regarding the role of UNOCI after the adoption of the Ouagadougou Agreement, OIOS also observed differing interpretations by the mission and Headquarters regarding the application of terms "support and accompany". OIOS found that the UNOCI interpretation of the accompanying role is narrower and more limited in scope than the interpretation at Headquarters. UNOCI interprets its role as being one of "accompanying" the Ivorians in undertaking relevant activities in the peace process and providing support as and when requested. OIOS notes, however, that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations at Headquarters interprets the role in a far broader and more inclusive sense, viewing the mission's role as more proactive in its support for securing the peace process. A similar interpretation was presented in the report of 26 June 2006 submitted by the management review mission of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.[10]

32. OIOS is of the opinion that these perspectives and differing interpretations of the supporting role of UNOCI in the context of the Ouagadougou Agreement are impacting its ability to implement its mandate and negatively affecting its contribution to the peace process. The absence of a clear and consistent definition of its role inhibits the overall efficiency and effectiveness of UNOCI operations and its approach to the implementation of its mandated tasks. Likewise, progress on the peace process is likely to be adversely affected as the expectations of all parties are not clear with regard to how UNOCI should undertake its role, and this could result in the mission and stakeholders working at cross purposes. In general, OIOS notes that aspects of the Ouagadougou Agreement are impacting the mission's overall achievement of results, however its presence remains critical to the peace process.

33. *UNOCI commented that it does not view its role in the peace process as being that passive but notes that it has found innovative and creative ways to support the peace process. UNOCI further commented, in regard to the OIOS recommendation that it seek greater clarity and guidance from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, that this is the prerogative of the Security Council and neither that of the mission nor of the Department.* OIOS maintains that there are differing interpretations of the mission's role and reiterates its recommendation that UNOCI should seek clarification from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations regarding the application of the terms "support and accompany".

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[9] In particular, supporting: the integrated command centre; restoring State administration throughout the country; the identification, voter registration and electoral processes; persons affected by the conflict; efforts to create a positive political environment; protection and promotion of human rights; and the economic recovery process of Côte d'Ivoire.

[10] The report of the management review mission noted that UNOCI did not have a shared vision of its role in the implementation of the Ougadougou Agreement. Some felt that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations would like the mission to play a more active role in assisting the implementation of the Agreement. The mission saw its role as pressing the Government to implement the Agreement.

3. The mission's impact is favourably assessed by the population of Côte d'Ivoire, who consider it necessary for stability and peace

34. The local results of the survey of the Ivorian population revealed that, in general, the population understands the role of the United Nations and United Nations peacekeeping forces in helping to end the conflict, as well as in providing a safe and stable environment. In particular, given the choice of the type of peacekeeping forces, 48 per cent of the population surveyed favoured United Nations-led interventions, followed by 44 per cent that favoured a hybrid United Nations/regional intervention. OIOS notes that this difference is not significant. Importantly, 55 per cent of civilians and 66 per cent of ex-combatants noted that the partnership between UNOCI and the French Licorne forces has made the mission more effective.

35. OIOS found that the population of Côte d'Ivoire had varied perceptions of the progress achieved by UNOCI in undertaking each of its mandated elements. Overall, 61 per cent of the population showed a preference for a more active role for the peacekeeping operation in reinforcing the peace process, for example, through the provision of enhanced support and assistance to programmes critical to the peace process such as, DDR/DDM.

36. OIOS notes that the most common form of contact between the Ivorian population and UNOCI was made by vehicular patrols, with more than half of the respondents reporting such contact at least weekly. Contact with other types of patrols, such as foot or helicopter patrols, was rare. The population expressed increased confidence due to the presence of peacekeepers across the country except in the war-affected regions of the centre and the north-west.[4] Furthermore, the population noted that if their physical security was somehow threatened, the majority (90 per cent) would turn to UNOCI.[11] Importantly, the mission's impartiality and general treatment of civilians was highly rated, with 79 per cent responding that UNOCI was impartial. The assessment varies by region, however, with the populations of the south and east regions being less positive in their perceptions of the nature of UNOCI's interactions with civilians. Overall, 76 per cent of respondents noted that UNOCI "always" treated civilians with dignity.

37. In general, the survey indicates that the population of Côte d'Ivoire holds a positive view of the United Nations and its peacekeeping operations.[12] The population appreciates the presence of UNOCI and its operations in the country and its critical role in the peace process. Furthermore, the survey noted strong regional trends in attitudes about how long UNOCI should stay in the country after the elections. The population in the centre and the north-west of the country and in the zone of confidence tend to believe that UNOCI should stay on in the country well after the elections; while in the south and east of the country the population showed less interest in a prolonged role for the mission.

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[11] In the survey of the Ivorian population, 75 per cent reported that they would turn to the Forces armées nationales de Côte d'Ivoire, 35 per cent to the Licorne forces and 10 per cent to the "Forces nouvelles".

[12] Perceptions regarding UNOCI's most negative role as recorded in the survey noted "prostitution", but just as often noted "nothing" or "don't know".

B. Strategic planning

1. Integrated strategic planning needs to be strengthened in order for the mission to achieve its mandate

38. UNOCI initiated its first full strategic and operational planning process in May 2007 by establishing an integrated mission planning team. Comprising a core group and four working groups, the team serves as a driver for the integrated approach to mission planning. The planning team developed the mission implementation plan framework for the mission, drawing upon the close cooperation between the mission components, external partners, the country team and Headquarters in New York. The implementation plan serves as the framework for planning at the unit and section levels and as a mechanism to monitor and assess the achievement of results. OIOS notes, however, that only one review has been undertaken, for the period from July to October 2007.

39. In its current form, UNOCI mission planning does not demonstrate a comprehensive approach that involves other mission planning tools and strategic priorities. For example, the priorities established after the signing of the Ouagadougou Agreement and the appointment of the current Special Representative of the Secretary-General shifted to security, elections, certification and the "1,000 micro-projects" initiative in support of the reinsertion strategy for ex-combatants. These priorities have not, however, been included in the current planning. In addition, OIOS found that UNOCI planning is not based on comprehensive mapping and assessment of risks and that, consequently, the implementation plan does not outline the strategies for achieving the intended measurable outcomes. Furthermore, while the plan includes cross-component integration within the mission, OIOS found that it did not do so comprehensively. Overall, at the strategic level, the plan does not present adequate direction and guidance for the various components to drive their operational planning, resource allocation, results-setting or developing strategies for mandate implementation. At the operational level, the plan must be further developed in order to provide the necessary guidance to the workplans of the units and sections and to link present activities to medium and long-term goals.

40. *UNOCI commented that due to its accompanying role, it would not only be irrelevant but also inimical to the safety of UNOCI staff to carry out strategic planning for elections, DDR and other fields.*

41. As noted above, the mission implementation plan was developed with the participation of and input from the United Nations country team. A joint task force was established to improve coordination and integration of planning processes and to oversee the integration of the programmatic work of UNOCI and the country team. The task force was also supposed to ensure a linkage and coherent operation of the planning elements in all United Nations agencies, but this planning lacked sufficient integration with the operations and activities of some key external partners, including the World Bank. In this regard, OIOS found that not all sections were included in the planning process. A more inclusive process is necessary in order to contribute to building commitment to the outcomes, encouraging ownership of the process at all levels, and building the foundation for future working relationships and intra-mission cooperation. This is one area that would benefit from wider knowledge sharing and established best practices in order to strengthen Organization-wide coherence.

42. *UNOCI commented that much had been achieved in the area of coordination between the country team and the mission. A strategic coordination group has been established under the chairmanship of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General/Humanitarian Coordinator/Resident Coordinator as a direct result of the joint country team/UNOCI retreat in June 2007. The combination role is much more advantageous than when the three roles are exercised separately.* While OIOS acknowledges UNOCI's comments, it reiterates its finding and its recommendation regarding strengthening the inclusiveness of the strategic planning process.

2. UNOCI lacks an exit strategy that addresses consolidation, drawdown and withdrawal for smooth transition

43. OIOS found that UNOCI, as part of its strategic planning, has not started to plan for the post-election phase to prepare for eventual consolidation, mission drawdown and exit, including transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. The United Nations will continue to have a presence in Côte d'Ivoire long after the withdrawal of UNOCI, given the broader partnership within the international community to establish peace and security in Côte d'Ivoire. The integrated mission planning process guidelines include some key triggers and benchmarks that the mission plan should contain for initiating transition and exit planning.[13]

44. OIOS found the mission's planning did not adhere to the guidance set out in the integrated mission planning process. To ensure smooth transition in consolidation, drawdown and withdrawal, attention must be given to parameters and lessons learned from past missions in establishing appropriate conditions for a successful withdrawal. This includes such critical components as the development of national institutional capacities, reconciliation between opposing parties and consolidation of gains from the peace process. Any hurried or unplanned exit could compromise gains made and progress achieved in the peace process.

45. *UNOCI commented that due to a lack of clear-cut milestones from the Ivorians themselves, it is very difficult to establish benchmarks as the Ivorians, and not the mission, are the owners of the process and therefore they determine timelines and benchmarks. UNOCI further commented that the transitional process will be dealt with further at an upcoming UNOCI country team retreat to be held towards the second part of February 2009, which will include the United Nations Development Assistance Framework process, which sets out the involvement of the Ivorian governmental institutions.*

C. Key programmatic processes

1. Electoral process faces persistent logistical and technical challenges

46. Elections were scheduled to be held in Côte d'Ivoire on 30 November 2008, however, as at 10 November 2008, the signatories to the peace process officially postponed the elections after meeting in Burkina Faso without any clear indication as to a firm future election date. UNOCI has provided ongoing support and technical advice in preparation for the elections, however, major persistent logistical

[13] Guidelines for the integrated mission planning process, endorsed by the Secretary-General on 13 June 2006.

challenges were highlighted to OIOS by national authorities, external stakeholders and partners and UNOCI staff. For example, insufficient resources for the elections continue to be a problem given the estimated budget of $86.5 million for the Independent Electoral Commission.

47. The postponement of elections presents UNOCI with an opportunity to reassert and utilize its capacity, experience, lessons learned and independence in the organization of elections. This would further help the national authorities in determining a credible electoral calendar and addressing requisite conditions that must be established prior to elections in a comprehensive manner. In addition, this would ensure that technical and logistical aspects are undertaken in a timely manner, before any scheduled date, in order to ensure a free, fair and transparent electoral process. Furthermore, as noted by the survey of the Ivorian population, the presence of UNOCI has had a positive impact on overall perceptions about electoral fairness. It appears that the mission's efforts to sensitize and conduct outreach on electoral issues in the country has strengthened confidence in the probable fairness of the upcoming elections and the mission should continue these activities. The survey further indicated that the current plans for ensuring safety and security during the election may need some further refinement.

48. *UNOCI commented that the proposed electoral timelines were shared with the Independent Electoral Commission early in the process in an effort to provide direction of time feasibility and in accordance with the Ivorian Commission's role to publish the electoral timeline.* OIOS stresses its finding and its recommendation, noting that UNOCI has the opportunity to reassert itself in this regard.

2. The dual roles of certification and supporting the elections pose a risk to the mission's credibility

49. In its resolution 1603 (2005), the Security Council, aiming to retain an autonomous function from that of UNOCI, requested the Secretary-General to appoint a high representative for the elections for Côte d'Ivoire. This role was later reassigned, however, and integrated with the role of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Côte d'Ivoire.[14] In the report of the technical assistance mission of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, it was noted that the new certification process carried considerable risks and could be used by disaffected parties to block the electoral process or dispute the outcome. OIOS concurs with that observation and notes that the role of certification undertaken by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General poses risks, including a potential conflict of interest, and that UNOCI should be cognizant of this during the electoral process.

50. Based on five criteria, the certification process encompasses the basis for open, free, fair and transparent elections.[15] External stakeholders and partners and UNOCI staff have expressed concern that the certification criteria constitutes only a broad outline of standards but that it does not address specific implementation in a

[14] Security Council resolution 1765 (2007), paras. 6 and 7.

[15] Five-criteria framework and elements for certification: (a) peace — movement of people including candidates, freedom of expression, non-intimidation by security forces, media and other actors; (b) inclusiveness — voters, candidates, political parties; (c) State media — impartiality, access, electoral campaign; (d) electoral list — mobile courts, reconstitution of civil rights, identification, registration, publication, voters' cards, acceptance; (e) results — voting, counting, announcing, settling disputes, acceptance.

precise, detailed manner. For example, the criteria regarding State media includes impartiality and equal access but does not give specific details about the actual airtime to be allocated to political parties on a daily or weekly basis. Furthermore, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General was mandated, under Security Council resolution 1765 (2007), to establish a certification cell to support him in the process. The certification cell is under the pillar of the Principal Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General rather than under the Special Representative, and, consequently, it may not be privy to the information and specific initiatives undertaken by the Special Representative in his contacts with political parties and national authorities. OIOS found that the cell is understaffed and that it had not set clear guidelines for collecting information pertaining to the five-criteria framework and certification elements from substantive sections and units. Reports from other substantive sections are submitted to the cell in an ad hoc manner with no standard format, even though the analysis depends on these reports for assessing compliance with the certification criteria.

51. *UNOCI commented that tying the certification framework to specific criteria would limit the chances of success as it would become a rigid tool for qualifying the elections as either "correct" or "incorrect."* However, OIOS stresses the need for clear criteria for the sake of transparency and clarity regarding certification of the electoral process.

3. Limited progress in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration/disarmament and dismantling of militias presents a risk to the peace process

52. The DDR programme in Côte d'Ivoire is a nationally driven process led by the Ivorian parties. UNOCI is mandated to support the national authorities in the implementation of the programme. OIOS found that due to slow progress in the peace process and the mission's unclear role, its contribution to the DDR process has been limited. Similarly, OIOS found little progress in the implementation of DDM, due to similar factors, which have slowed the progress of DDR. For example, agreement has not been reached on issues regarding the payment of allowances to ex-combatants and there is a delay of the national civic service programme in support of reintegration activities.

53. OIOS found that the planning and coordination on DDR activities among the mission's key entities regarding support to the national authorities, including for post-electoral activities, is weak. There is a need for greater coordination between the substantive, support and military components of the mission in order to ensure that planning and activities are fully coordinated. For example, greater coordination is needed between the support component and the DDR Section for planning logistical support to DDR activities. Similarly, improvement is needed between the DDR Section and the Public Information Office regarding the sensitization of the Ivorians on the DDR and DDM programmes.

54. *UNOCI commented that there is close cooperation between the DDR Section and the military and mission support components for the planning of DDR activities and that the DDR Section coordinates its work closely with the Public Information Office at Headquarters and at the field level for all sensitization activities related to DDR. The mission also cited examples of cooperative activities with the Public Information Office in several forums intended to sensitize the Ivorian public.* OIOS emphasizes the need for greater planning and coordination between the substantive,

support and military components at all levels, and maintains its recommendation that UNOCI strengthen planning and coordination to support its implementation of DDR/DDM activities.

55. OIOS also notes that the integrated command centre has the overall responsibility for coordinating the military aspects of DDR/DDM programmes and promoting the assimilation of opposing forces into an integrated national army.[16] A UNOCI DDR operations centre was established at the integrated command centre to strengthen its planning and coordination capacities. While the mission continues to provide logistical support to the command centre, including transportation, communications and office equipment, OIOS found that there is an apparent lack of institutional capacity in terms of experienced staff and resources in UNOCI to adequately support it. This could compromise its capability in performing its tasks and also presents a potential risk to national security in the event that the integrated command centre is inundated with threats, for example, during the elections or while confronting disenfranchised militias. *With regard to the integrated command centre, UNOCI commented that it is difficult to strengthen the centre as long as it is not fully operational and has a limited role in the implementation of the Ouagadougou Agreement.*

56. It is significant that the survey of the Ivorian population found that DDR remains a priority area of concern due to the slow progress in its implementation. The survey found that the population had the perception that due to its slow progress, security would remain in the hands of the local armed groups. This has consequences for security during elections and could influence the perception of elections being free, fair and transparent. In addition, the slow progress could result in the ex-combatants being frustrated as their expectations of allowances and/or employment opportunities are delayed, which could negatively affect the peace process. OIOS notes that the fourth supplementary agreement to the Ouagadougou Agreement calls for the disarmament of the Forces nouvelles and the militias at least two months prior to elections, which is a positive shift with regard to the security situation during and after elections.

57. The postponement of elections presents UNOCI with an opportunity to review the support it provides to the national authorities regarding the implementation of the DDR/DDM programmes and to develop a more comprehensive planning framework, including a realistic timeline and benchmarks. In addition, the framework should set out a plan for informing the public and potential recipients about the DDR/DDM programmes. UNOCI should also conduct a needs assessment and address national capacity for the eventual transition into a peacebuilding environment where the focus will be on development, return, reintegration and recovery.

58. OIOS notes that, despite a lack of progress on DDR/DDM, various programmes are planned to address the reinsertion needs of ex-combatants. In particular, the "1,000 micro-projects" programme, funded with a $5 million grant from the Peacebuilding Fund, was launched in August 2008. This project will benefit 15,000 ex-combatants and aims to maintain peace and stability during the

[16] Under part III of the Ouagadougou Agreement, a national integrated command centre was established and assumed responsibility for unification of the two forces, the restructuring of the defence and security forces and the implementation of the national programme of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

pre-election period. Other projects include community-based quick-impact projects and other reinsertion projects to be funded by the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

59. OIOS notes that none of the above projects were fully implemented three months before the scheduled elections of 30 November 2008. Furthermore, OIOS could not determine if a formal needs assessment had been undertaken to determine the actual needs and preferences of beneficiaries. For example, the majority of projects are agriculturally based, and some ex-combatants noted that they would have preferred the opportunity to undertake other initiatives, including market stalls or technology skills. OIOS also notes that, without proper consultation, it is unlikely that the membership of the project selection committees can be fully cognizant or conversant with the actual needs of the ex-combatants. Likewise, there has been a lack of in-depth sensitization on the projects. These shortcomings can constitute significant risks to the success of the micro-projects. Additionally, OIOS notes a lack of joint planning and coordination between UNOCI and other development agencies and external partners, such as the World Bank, which is funding long-term reintegration programmes.

60. *On the issue of the "1,000 micro-projects", UNOCI commented that beneficiaries have been consulted on their reinsertion preferences at the demobilization phase and that subsequent technical assessments have been undertaken by the UNOCI DDR Section, UNDP and the National Programme for Reinsertion and Community Rehabilitation on DDR to determine the pertinence and chance of success of a project. UNOCI also commented that during the screening process, the National Programme had determined the needs of ex-combatants based on individual interviews in which they expressed their wishes on reinsertion. In addition, since the OIOS mission in August 2008, the micro-projects have broadened in scope, and currently 52 projects (out of a total of 217) are non-agricultural.* While OIOS acknowledges UNOCI's comments, it maintains that the reinsertion projects need to be assessed in a clear, documented and systematic manner.

4. UNOCI lacks an overarching strategy to coordinate security sector reform

61. OIOS notes that UNOCI does not have an integrated plan for security sector reform, nor is there an overarching strategy for the various mission components that are separately involved with different aspects of the reform. For example, the rule of law component addresses issues of judiciary reform and corrections, the military component addresses issues on restructuring the defence forces in coordination with the integrated command centre, and the police component addresses various issues on reform of the police and gendarmerie. OIOS found that, in the absence of an overarching framework for integrated operations, all these areas work separately without an integrated approach. In the report of the Secretary-General on the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform, the Secretary-General noted the requirement for a strategic framework for security sector reform processes and governance as well as a needs assessment that would provide a basis for an overarching strategy.[17]

62. In the context of the Ouagadougou Agreement, the mandate of UNOCI in respect of security sector reform requires the mission to assist the Government in

[17] See A/62/659-S/2008/39.

formulating a national plan on the restructuring of the reunified armed forces of Côte d'Ivoire. The overall framework on the organization, composition and functioning of the reunified armed forces should have been adopted by the Government by 15 December 2007. OIOS notes that this deadline was not achieved and that the reunification of the security forces has not taken place. The Ivorian parties disagree over ranks and numbers of personnel to be integrated into the new national defence and security forces. It is now expected that the issue will be addressed after the elections.

D. Coordination and security

1. Coordination with regional partners needs strengthening

63. Although the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire is largely an internal conflict, it has far-reaching regional dimensions. In recognition thereof, coordination between UNOCI and regional organizations is mentioned no less than six times in its mandate.[18] OIOS notes that UNOCI has developed good coordination arrangements with UNMIL, the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) and the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA) through regular meetings of Special Representatives of the Secretary-General and Force Commanders as well as other meetings with other sections such as the military, the United Nations police and mission support. In addition, there have been regular exchanges of staff members for training seminars and workshops between UNOCI and UNMIL. There is good coordination between UNOCI and the other United Nations missions in the region. In the case of UNOWA, the focus has remained on strategic issues and little attention has been given to coordination of specific substantive activities such as DDR/DDM and elections.

64. OIOS notes that coordination between UNOCI and UNOWA can be further enhanced through regular meetings of staff at the operational level representing substantive areas in these missions. Additionally, the exchange of pertinent code cables regarding activities and events that have potential regional implications, such as elections in neighbouring countries scheduled within a similar time frame, would be useful. Furthermore, UNOCI could benefit from the regional coordination role of UNOWA as well as during planning for eventual transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. In this regard, the guidance of the Department of Political Affairs could also be useful in the mission's integrated planning regarding a continued United Nations presence in the country.

2. The mission needs to review its security procedures

65. OIOS observed that in the current environment in Côte d'Ivoire there is a potential risk of an outbreak of violence and a deterioration of security. For that reason, the security of United Nations personnel and property demands increased

[18] In the UNOCI mandate, reference is made to: monitoring the border with Liberia with attention to the situation of refugees; coordination with UNMIL in the voluntary repatriation and resettlement programme for foreign combatants; reform of the security sector with assistance from the African Union and ECOWAS; to monitor the arms embargo and cross-border movement of weapons; redeployment of state administration with assistance of African Union and ECOWAS; and organization of free, fair, open and transparent elections with the support of the African Union and ECOWAS.

priority and attention by the mission. OIOS found that, currently, the Chief Security Adviser is no longer a member of the senior management team under the new pillar structure, a move that could compromise performance and effectiveness of security management at the mission. OIOS found that the overall application of security procedures is weak, including access to mission premises and the dissemination of information relating to the security situation. Specifically, the issuance and checking of identification credentials as well as security screening of vehicles entering United Nations premises is not compliant with established United Nations security procedures. It is vitally important that UNOCI senior management ensure that security policies, instructions and procedures are implemented and are operating effectively, particularly in the light of the prevailing tense security situation in Côte d'Ivoire.

V. Conclusion

66. OIOS concludes that substantial progress has been made with regard to the mandated elements over which the mission has direct operational control, although limited progress has been achieved in certain areas in which UNOCI plays a supporting role, as mandated, owing to the slowness in the peace process. OIOS further concludes that due to the change in roles of UNOCI and the Ivorians subsequent to the signing of the Ouagadougou Agreement, with the Ivorians taking ownership of the peace process and UNOCI supporting and accompanying them, progress has been affected. The elections are an important part of the peace process in Côte d'Ivoire and their postponement presents an opportunity for UNOCI to review its support and guidance to the national authorities, particularly in those areas where progress has been slow. Furthermore, UNOCI needs to strengthen its strategic planning by ensuring that it is continuous and that it integrates all elements of the mission. In particular, current priorities should be reviewed regularly and developed so that the resulting strategic plan is a relevant instrument for the mission in implementing its mandate and in anticipation of its drawdown and exit.

67. Importantly, OIOS concludes that the country's population holds a positive view about the United Nations and its peacekeeping operations and that UNOCI has largely fulfilled the population's expectations by providing a safe and secure environment, a necessary condition for peace and development to transpire.

VI. Recommendations

68. Based on these evaluation findings, OIOS makes the following 16 recommendations.

Recommendation 1

69. UNOCI should review the concept of operations, rules of engagement and other operational guidelines, particularly with regard to the protection of civilians, and should ensure they are disseminated, understood and rehearsed, as necessary (see para. 17).

Recommendation 2

70. UNOCI should seek greater clarity and guidance from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations on its post-Ouagadougou Agreement role in undertaking its mandate (see paras. 28 to 33).

Recommendation 3

71. UNOCI should review and update its strategic planning, based on a risk assessment, and should ensure its role as a relevant instrument for mission resource planning, management and decision-making processes in order to serve as a relevant tool for achieving the strategic objectives of the mission (see paras. 38 to 40).

Recommendation 4

72. UNOCI should review and strengthen its planning process to make it more inclusive, both vertically and laterally within the mission, including the involvement of all key partners and stakeholders with the objective of making it a relevant basis for shared ownership of the process and prioritization of resources (see para. 41).

Recommendation 5

73. UNOCI should undertake a systematic and comprehensive analysis leading to strategic planning for consolidation, gradual drawdown and eventual exit; it should also develop appropriate indicators and benchmarks to begin a handover that would ensure the consolidation of the gains of the peace process (see paras. 43 and 44).

Recommendation 6

74. UNOCI should provide advice and guidance to the national authorities of Côte d'Ivoire in planning elections based on realistic benchmarks, including addressing the remaining logistical and technical challenges, in order to ensure a credible electoral process (see paras. 46 and 47).

Recommendation 7

75. UNOCI should review and strengthen the capacity of the certification cell and establish a mechanism for collection of information pertaining to the five-criteria framework and certification elements from the substantive sections to the certification cell (see paras. 49 and 50).

Recommendation 8

76. UNOCI should strengthen its planning and coordination to support the implementation of DDR/DDM activities, ensuring timely input among mission components (see paras. 52 and 53).

Recommendation 9

77. UNOCI should review and strengthen the institutional capacity of the integrated command centre, as necessary, by providing staff and resources for training and mentoring nationally managed operations in order to support the effective implementation of DDR (see para. 55).

Recommendation 10

78. UNOCI should review its support to the national authorities regarding the implementation of the DDR/DDM programmes and develop a more comprehensive planning framework that includes a realistic timeline and benchmarks (see paras. 56 and 57).

Recommendation 11

79. UNOCI should strengthen the effectiveness of short-range reinsertion efforts for ex-combatants by providing comprehensive information on these programmes, including the purpose, duration and economic benefits, through public information sensitization campaigns (see para. 59).

Recommendation 12

80. UNOCI should undertake a needs assessment in implementing the "1,000 micro-projects" initiative in order to determine the needs and preferences of potential beneficiaries. This could involve direct consultation with the beneficiaries (see para. 59).

Recommendation 13

81. UNOCI should strengthen DDR/DDM planning and coordination with development agencies and external partners, in order to optimize the efficiency and effectiveness of reintegration programmes (see para. 59).

Recommendation 14

82. UNOCI should develop an overarching security sector reform framework to integrate planning and coordination for the implementation of a security sector reform programme in Côte d'Ivoire (see paras. 61 and 62).

Recommendation 15

83. UNOCI should strengthen its coordination with regional missions and also integrate its planning particularly for post-electoral phase for the mission's gradual drawdown and withdrawal (see paras. 63 and 64).

Recommendation 16

84. UNOCI should undertake a comprehensive security assessment to ensure full compliance with established United Nations security procedures and should take appropriate measures, including training and briefing of staff members; additionally, the Chief Security Adviser should be reinstated as a member of the senior management team (see para. 65).

(*Signed*) Inga-Britt Ahlenius
Under-Secretary-General for Internal Oversight Services

9 February 2009